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INTRODUCTION
George Ricks faces a dilemma. Idaho demands that he either violate
his religious beliefs or give up his livelihood.1 Under Idaho law, Ricks
must register with the State to work as a contractor. 2 To register, Ricks
must list his Social Security number on his contractor application solely
for identification.3 But Ricks cannot do so because his religious beliefs
forbid him from providing a government number to buy or sell goods and
services. 4 Despite Ricks’s sincere religious beliefs, Idaho denied Ricks’s
application because he could not provide his Social Security number.5
The Constitution’s Free Exercise Clause provides a potential solution
for Ricks. It requires Idaho to accommodate Ricks’s religious beliefs if it
can. The text is plain. The Free Exercise Clause forbids the government
from “prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]” thereby guaranteeing the
right to freely exercise religion.6 So the government must avoid laws that
burden religion, or it must accommodate religion when law and religion
* Staff Attorney, National Right to Work Foundation; J.D., magna cum laude, Regent University School
of Law; B.A. & B.S., magna cum laude, Susquehanna University. Several arguments in this paper began
in an amicus brief I authored in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia on behalf of Dorothy Frame, Annlee Post,
and the Right to Work Foundation. The views reflected in this Article are exclusively mine along with the
responsibility for any errors.
1. Ricks v. State Contractors Bd., 435 P.3d 1, 4 (Idaho Ct. App. 2018).
2. Id. at 7.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 4; see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 7, 14, Ricks v. State Contractors Bd., 141
S. Ct. 2850 (2021) (No. 19-66).
5. Ricks, 435 P.3d at 4.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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conflict.7 The Supreme Court, however, eliminated this protection for
Ricks.
In Employment Division v. Smith, the Supreme Court gutted the Free
Exercise Clause. 8 The Court rewrote the clause and replaced it with an
equal protection rule: the government can prohibit the free exercise of
religion under a neutral and generally applicable law. 9 So the Free
Exercise Clause does not guarantee the right to exercise religion; under
Smith, it only promises equal treatment.
Ricks’s case illustrates the result. Based on Smith, the Idaho Court of
Appeals held that Idaho could prohibit Ricks’s religious exercise. 10 Even
though Ricks was willing to provide a birth certificate11—which Idaho
accepts in other licensing contexts12—Smith eliminates any duty to
accommodate. So Idaho need not accept alternate identification. Nor must
Idaho offer a reason for its rule or its refusal to accommodate. Because
the law requiring a Social Security number is neutral and generally
applicable, under Smith, Idaho may force Ricks to choose between his
livelihood and his religion.13
In essence, Smith allows the government to prohibit religious exercise
without a good reason—or with no reason at all—if it treats religion and
non-religion equally.14 Ricks’s case is sadly one among many that shows
Smith’s devastating consequences. 15 Smith means that the government
need not make even the most minor exception to allow individuals, like
Ricks, to practice their faith. Our Founders required more.
The Founders created the Free Exercise Clause to require more than
generally applicable equal suppression. They considered religious liberty

7. Cf. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (examining whether state conduct “imposes
any burden on the free exercise of appellant’s religion”); cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972)
(stating the government violates the Free Exercise Clause when it “unduly burdens the free exercise of
religion”).
8. Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
9. Id. at 878–79.
10. Ricks, 435 P.3d at 12–14.
11. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 1, Ricks v. State Contractors Bd., 141 S. Ct. 2850 (2021)
(No. 19-66).
12. Compare IDAHO CODE § 73-122 (1999) (requiring a Social Security number for a professional
or occupational license but providing an exception), with IDAHO CODE § 54-5210 (2009) (requiring
applicants to provide a Social Security number to register as a contractor without exception).
13. Ricks, 435 P.3d at 12–13. The Idaho Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court
denied review. Ricks, 141 S. Ct. 2850 (denying certiorari); see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 1,
Ricks, 141 S. Ct. 2850 (No. 19-66). (noting review denied).
14. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 546 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (Smith allows
“the government to prohibit [religious exercise], without justification . . . [if] the prohibition is generally
applicable.”).
15. Id. at 547 (citing examples just after Smith showing how it “harmed religious liberty”).
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an unalienable right that supersedes civil society’s claims.16 When law
and religion conflicted, the Founders created religious exemptions to
allow individuals to freely exercise their religion. 17 They enacted the Free
Exercise Clause to do the same. Smith, however, abandons religious
liberty and cedes the free exercise of religion to the political process.
Smith is untenable.
At bottom, Smith rests on a false policy argument: to prevent anarchy
the Court must jettison religious liberty.18 This is untrue.19 Experience
from the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), state
RFRAs and constitutional provisions, and the federal Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) show that religious
freedom does not create anarchy. 20 Far from it, it allows individuals to
live together in peace. In short, Smith’s arguments fail.
Thus, there is no reason to retain Smith. At least ten Justices have
agreed that Smith is wrong—including six in Fulton v. City of
Philadelphia.21 Yet the Court continues to expand and wrestle with
Smith’s many ill-defined exceptions. This is not a solution. The exception
approach treats symptoms rather than the problem.
The problem is Smith. Smith does not protect religious liberty or
prevent religious persecution and conflict. Even when the Supreme Court
vindicates religion under Smith, the decisions rest on government
missteps—not the freedom to practice religion.22 Thus, Smith always
leaves governments free to rectify mistakes and prohibit the free exercise
of religion again. Smith dismantled the Free Exercise Clause and harms
religion. It is time to revisit Smith.
In Section I, this article examines Smith and shows that it was wrongly
decided: the majority gave no sound reason to abandon religious freedom.
In Section II, this article examines the Free Exercise Clause and shows
how Smith conflicts with the clause’s text, purpose, and original meaning.

16. JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS (June
20, 1785), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-08-02-0163.
17. See infra Section II(C)(4).
18. See infra Section I(E).
19. See infra Section I(E)(1).
20. Id.
21. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1931 (2021) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“No
fewer than ten Justices—including six sitting Justices—have questioned [Smith’s] fidelity to the
Constitution.”).
22. Id. at 1930 (“[T]he majority’s course guarantees that this litigation is only getting started. . . .
The City can revise its [ordinance.] . . . Or with a flick of a pen, municipal lawyers may rewrite the City’s
contract to [prohibit Catholic Social Services’ religious exercise.]”); Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. C.R.
Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1732 (2018) (protecting religion on narrow grounds and noting “[t]he [final]
outcome of cases like this . . . must await further elaboration”).
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I: EMPLOYMENT DIVISION V. SMITH
Before Employment Division v. Smith, courts and commentators
largely agreed on the free exercise framework.23 The consensus was that
the government must satisfy strict scrutiny to burden religion under the
Free Exercise Clause.24 Thus, the government could not enforce a law that
burdened religious exercise unless it showed that it had a compelling
reason to burden religious exercise, and the burden was the least
restrictive means to attain its compelling interest.25 This is generally the
highest standard of constitutional protection.26 It is reserved for cases that
involve fundamental rights or suspect classifications.27
Although many cases referenced and applied strict scrutiny, the
Supreme Court often ruled against religion. Between Wisconsin v. Yoder28
in 1972 and Smith in 1990, all free exercise claims outside the
unemployment context lost.29 Strict scrutiny did not produce surefire
victories for religion. In some cases, the Supreme Court may have relaxed
the strict scrutiny standard. But federal and state judges, along with
legislatures and executive bodies, generally did not.30 Everyone agreed
that the strict scrutiny test applied, even if it led to inconsistent Supreme
Court results.31
A. Smith needlessly abandoned religious liberty.
Smith, by a 5–4 vote, jettisoned strict scrutiny, or “the compelling
interest test”—along with any other heightened protection for religion.32
The Court held that a person’s free exercise right does not relieve his duty
to “comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability’” that
conflicts with his religion.33 The majority stated, in other words, “an
individual’s religious beliefs [do not] excuse him from compliance with

23. Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1109, 1109–10 (1990).
24. Id.
25. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
See also McConnell, supra note 23, at 1110.
26. See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 443 (2015) (referring to strict scrutiny as “the
highest level of First Amendment protection”).
27. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16 (1973).
28. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972) (exempting individuals from valid, generally
applicable school attendance laws based on their religion).
29. McConnell, supra note 23, at 1110.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1109–10.
32. Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 873, 878–90 (1990).
33. Id. at 879.
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an otherwise valid law.”34 Thus, the Free Exercise Clause does not require
exemptions or accommodation from general laws that prohibit religious
exercise. No substantive, constitutional right to exercise religion remains
after Smith.
1. Smith altered the Free Exercise Clause
based on a hypothetical question.
The case arose when Alfred Smith and Galen Black applied for
unemployment benefits.35 They worked at a drug rehabilitation clinic
until the clinic fired them for ingesting peyote—a hallucinogenic drug.36
Both Smith and Black “ingested peyote for sacramental purposes” as
communion at a Native American Church ceremony. 37 The Oregon
Department of Human Resources denied their claim for unemployment
benefits because their employer fired them for work-related misconduct.38
But the State intermediate and highest appellate courts reversed. They
held that the State could not consider religious exercise as misconduct
that bars unemployment benefits.39 This holding was unexceptional. The
Supreme Court had reached the same conclusion in four cases in which it
held that states must exempt applicants from unemployment requirements
that conflict with their religion.40
The Supreme Court, however, vacated and remanded the case to the
lower court to decide whether the Free Exercise Clause allowed the State
to criminalize religious peyote use.41 If the State could criminalize
religious peyote use, the Court reasoned, the State could also deny
unemployment benefits on that basis.42 The Court tried to distinguish its
other unemployment cases by stating that they did not involve criminal
misconduct.43 But the majority ignored contrary state law. The Oregon
Supreme Court already held that criminal peyote use does not disqualify
an individual from unemployment benefits under state law. 44 So Oregon

34. Id. at 878–79.
35. Id. at 874.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.; Black v. Emp. Div., 721 P.2d 451, 453 (Or. 1986), vacated sub nom. Emp. Div. v. Smith,
485 U.S. 660 (1988); Smith v. Emp. Div., 721 P.2d 445, 451 (Or. 1986), vacated, 485 U.S. 660 (1988).
40. Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp. Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Rev. Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963).
41. Emp. Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660 673–74 (1988).
42. Id. at 670.
43. Id. at 671.
44. Smith, 721 P.2d at 450.
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had no interest in enforcing its criminal laws when it denies
unemployment benefits.45 Under Oregon law, the criminal question was
irrelevant.
On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court reiterated that it makes no
difference whether religious peyote use is illegal.46 It is “immaterial to
Oregon’s unemployment compensation law” if religious peyote use
violates “some other law.”47 Thus, the court reaffirmed its decision.48 It
also answered the Supreme Court’s hypothetical question. It found that
state law prohibits peyote use and makes no exception for religious peyote
use.49 But it determined that the Free Exercise Clause would prevent the
State—if it tried—from prosecuting religious peyote use—“a sacrament
in the Native American Church.”50
The United States Supreme Court then granted certiorari to decide
whether a state can constitutionally prohibit religious peyote use. 51 Smith,
therefore, involved a hypothetical question that was “immaterial” under
state law.52 Oregon did not attempt to prosecute Smith or Black, and it
made little effort to prosecute other religious peyote users.53 The case only
involved unemployment benefits.
2. Smith resolved a question no one asked
and adopted a position for which no one argued.
The parties and amici in Smith all agreed on the basic Free Exercise
Clause framework: to burden a person’s religious exercise, the
government must have a compelling interest and the burden must be no
greater than necessary to achieve that compelling interest. 54 The briefs
and arguments focused on whether the State had a compelling interest to
45. Smith, 485 U.S. at 674 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The Oregon Supreme Court [disavowed]
any state interest in enforcing its criminal laws through the denial of unemployment benefits.”).
46. Smith v. Emp. Div., 763 P.2d 146, 147 (Or. 1988), rev’d, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 150.
49. Id. at 148.
50. Id. at 147–48.
51. Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).
52. Smith, 763 P.2d at 147.
53. Smith, 494 U.S. at 911 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
54. Brief for Respondents at 16, Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (No. 88-1213) (“The state may justify an
inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling
state interest.”); Brief for Petitioners at 12, 16, Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (No. 88-1213); Brief for the American
Jewish Congress as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 24–26, Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (No. 88-1213);
Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Oregon as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 30–41, Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (No. 88-1213); Brief for the Council on Religious Freedom
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 10, Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (No. 88-1213); Brief for the
Association on American Indian Affairs et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 10, Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (No. 88-1213).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2022

7

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 91, Iss. 2 [2022], Art. 3

2022]

REVISITING EMPLOYMENT DIVISION V. SMITH

403

prohibit religious peyote use.55
No party in the case questioned or asked the Court to review its free
exercise framework. 56 The State conceded that the compelling interest test
applied. It made two arguments: First, the “government has a
‘compelling’ interest in laws that control the use and availability of
dangerous drugs.”57 Second, the State could not “‘accommodate’
[Smith’s and Black’s] religious drug use without disserving . . . its
compelling interest in comprehensive drug control.”58 The State admitted,
even if it had a compelling interest, a “question remains whether [the]
government can ‘accommodate’ religious drug use by exempting it from
the reach of the criminal prohibition.”59 The State also recognized that the
Free Exercise Clause requires exemptions. It wrote in its brief: “If
government can allow a religion-based exemption without compromising
its interest, the Free Exercise Clause requires it to do so.”60
C. Smith ignored the Free Exercise Clause’s text.
Smith’s analysis rightly begins with the Free Exercise Clause’s text.
The text provides that the government “shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”61
Smith acknowledged that religiously motivated conduct—like the
conduct Oregon prohibited—is an “exercise of religion.”62 Yet Smith held
that prohibiting Black’s and Smith’s exercise of religion was not
“prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].”63
The majority asserted that the text means the government cannot
prohibit acts only when they are done for religious reasons.64 But it
claimed that it is “one large step further” to say that the text—which
forbids “prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]”—forbids enforcing
laws that prohibit the exercise of religion.65 The majority meagerly stated:
“As a textual matter, we do not think the words must be given that
meaning.”66 The majority summarily concluded that “[i]t is a permissible
reading of the text . . . to say that if prohibiting the exercise of religion . .
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

See briefs cited supra note 54.
Id.
Brief for Petitioners at 12, Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (No. 88-1213).
Id. at 18.
Id. at 16.
Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
Smith, 494 U.S. at 877–78).
Id.
Id. at 877.
Id. at 878.
Id.
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. is not the object . . . but merely the incidental effect of a generally
applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not
been offended.”67 In other words, a law only prohibits the free exercise of
religion when that is the law’s object. Because Oregon’s drug laws
generally applied and did not intentionally prohibit Black’s and Smith’s
religious exercise, they did not prohibit “the free exercise [of religion].”68
D. Smith conflicts with Free Exercise Clause precedent.
The Smith majority did not consider the Free Exercise Clause’s original
meaning. The majority instead argued that precedent drove its holding.69
The majority claimed that the Court “never held that an individual’s
religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid
law.”70 Yet in Wisconsin v. Yoder—and many other cases—the Court
excused individuals from otherwise valid laws based on religion.71 The
Court also applied the compelling interest test, which the Smith majority
claimed was inapplicable, at least three times in the year before Smith
alone.72 Two of those decisions were unanimous.73
In Yoder, for example, the Court excused individuals from otherwise
valid school attendance laws based on their religion. 74 The Amish
plaintiffs asserted that a compulsory school attendance law conflicted
with their religion.75 Notably, the Supreme Court rejected the argument
that the State could require them to attend school because the school’s
attendance law “applies uniformly to all citizens . . . and does not, on its
face, discriminate against religions.”76 It is irrelevant, according to Yoder,
whether a law that burdens religion “is motivated by legitimate secular
concerns.”77 The Court stated that “[a] regulation neutral on its face may,
67. Id. (emphasis added).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 878–79.
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp. Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Hobbie v. Unemployment
Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Rev. Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943).
72. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 384–85 (1990) (“The free
exercise inquiry asks whether government has placed a substantial burden on the observation of a central
religious belief or practice and, if so, whether a compelling governmental interest justifies the burden.”
(quoting Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989))); Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 699 (same); Frazee,
489 U.S. at 835 (“And, as we have said in the past, there may exist state interests sufficiently compelling
to override a legitimate claim to the free exercise of religion. No such interest has been presented here.”).
73. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, 493 U.S. at 380; Frazee, 489 U.S. at 835.
74. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 236.
75. Id. at 209–10.
76. Id. at 220.
77. Id.
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in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for
governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of
religion.”78 When a neutral regulation burdens religious exercise, the
Court held that, “only those interests of the highest order and those not
otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of
religion.”79 The Court in Yoder hailed this rule as “[t]he essence of all that
has been said and written on the subject.”80
So too the precedents that Smith relied on refute the claim that
precedent dictated its holding.81 To support its position, the Smith
majority could only marshal one overruled opinion and one other
opinion—based on a premise that Smith itself rejects—as its chief
precedents.82 Smith’s chief precents are Minserville School District v.
Gobitis and Reynolds v. United States.83
In Gobitis, the Supreme Court allowed the government to prosecute
children who refused to recite the Pledge of Allegiance for religious
reasons.84 Gobitis held that religious freedom stops when it conflicts with
“a general law.”85 The Court argued, in rhetoric quoted by Smith, that
“[c]onscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for
religious toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a general
law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs.”86
The Supreme Court overruled Gobitis three years later in West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette—a widely celebrated opinion.87
Barnette held that a general law stops when it conflicts with fundamental
rights—such as religious freedom.88 Thus, the Court “relieved” students
who had religious objections to pledging allegiance and saluting the flag
“from obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction
of religious beliefs.”89 Barnette turned Gobitis on its head.90

78. Id.
79. Id. at 215.
80. Id.
81. Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–79 (1990).
82. Id. (relying on two cases in the paragraph contending that precedent guided its interpretation);
McConnell, supra note 23, at 1124–25 (showing the majority relied on two cases, along with a concurring
opinion, as its “primary affirmative precedent”). For a comprehensive discussion reviewing every case
the majority relied on and distinguished, see McConnell, supra note 23, at 1120–27.
83. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 591 (1940), overruled by W. Va. State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
84. Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 600.
85. Id. at 594.
86. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 594).
87. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
88. Id. at 629–30, 638–39, 642.
89. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1913 (2021) (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting
Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 594).
90. Id.
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The Smith majority also heavily relied on Reynolds.91 In Reynolds, the
Supreme Court upheld a Mormon’s polygamy conviction under the Free
Exercise Clause.92 Yet “the decision was not based on anything like
Smith’s interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause.”93 The decision hinged
on the premise that the Free Exercise Clause protects religious belief—
not conduct.94 The Court, however, repudiated that premise at least half a
century before Smith.95 Indeed, the Smith majority itself rejected
Reynolds’s premise and reaffirmed that the Free Exercise Clause protects
religious belief and conduct.96 Thus, Reynolds is flawed.
Both Reynolds and Gobitis fundamentally misapprehended the First
Amendment. The Court recognized these errors for nearly fifty years—
until Smith.
At the same time, the majority invented senseless explanations—based
on hybrid rights and unemployment benefits—to allow the many wellknown precents that contradict Smith. Both explanations fail.
1. Smith’s attempts to distinguish conflicting cases
based on a hybrid rights theory fail.
The Smith majority tried to distinguish the many cases that applied the
compelling interest test and exempted religion from general laws. 97 The
majority claimed that these cases involved hybrid rights.98 The only free
exercise decisions, according to the majority, that excused believers from
generally applicable laws involved the Free Exercise Clause “in
conjunction with other constitutional protections.”99
Constitutional rights, however, do not depend on other rights. They are
independent and have distinct meaning. As the Sixth Circuit noted: the
argument “that the legal standard under the Free Exercise Clause depends
on whether a free-exercise claim is coupled with other constitutional
rights . . . is completely illogical.”100 The Free Exercise Clause must mean
something, and that meaning cannot depend on a plaintiff’s arbitrary
decisions about unrelated claims. Either the Free Exercise Clause requires
religious exemptions from general laws, or it does not. If a free exercise
claim is insufficient, it is irrelevant whether a plaintiff adds another
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Smith, 494 U.S. at 879.
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 (1878).
Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1913 (2021) (Alito, J., concurring).
Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166–67.
E.g., Cantwell v Connecticut, 310 US 296, 303–04 (1940).
Smith, 494 U.S. at 877.
See e.g., cases cited supra notes 87–87.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 881–82.
Id. at 881.
Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993).
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insufficient claim. It is absurd to say that a law violates neither the Free
Exercise Clause nor the Free Speech Clause on its own and yet somehow
violates both. If, on the other hand, the hybrid theory requires a viable
companion claim, then the free exercise claim is pointless. 101 The theory
is untenable.
The hybrid distinction also misrepresents caselaw. The Supreme Court
in Yoder rejected the hybrid theory. It stated that parents have no right to
avoid a law for nonreligious reasons.102 The Court unambiguously held:
“A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be interposed
as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of education if it is based on
purely secular considerations; to have the protection of the Religion
Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious belief.”103 Under Yoder,
parents have no right outside the Free Exercise Clause to avoid
compulsory education laws. 104 Professor Michael McConnell, perhaps the
foremost scholar on the Free Exercise Clause, 105 suggests that the
majority concocted its hybrid theory solely to distinguish Yoder.106
The distinction, moreover, fails even if it were valid. The problem with
Smith’s hybrid theory is that virtually every case involves hybrid rights.107
The Native American Church ceremony, like many religious symbols and
practices, communicates a message.108 If burning a flag and nude dancing
are expressive conduct because they communicate a message, 109 the
Native American Church ceremony is no less expressive. Thus, the Smith
plaintiffs could have brought both a free speech and free exercise claim.
Even if the speech claim would have lost if brought separately, Smith’s
logic suggests that the free speech and free exercise claims should have
prevailed as a hybrid right.110 Thus, it is hard to take Smith’s hybrid rights

101. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1918 (2021) (Alito, J., concurring) (requiring
an “independently viable claim . . . makes the free-exercise claim irrelevant”); Axson-Flynn v. Johnson,
356 F.3d 1277, 1296–97 (10th Cir. 2004) (same).
102. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 537–38 (1997) (concurring, J., Scalia) (calling
Professor McConnell Smith’s “most prominent scholarly critic”).
106. McConnell, supra note 23, at 1121.
107. See Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1915.
108. Id.
109. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991) (“[N]ude dancing of the kind sought
to be performed here is expressive conduct.”); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405–06 (1989) (holding
that burning a flag as a political demonstration is expressive conduct).
110. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 567 (1993) (Souter,
J., concurring).
[T]he distinction . . . [is] untenable. If a hybrid claim is simply one in which another constitutional
right is implicated, then the hybrid exception would probably be so vast as to swallow the Smith
rule, and, indeed, the hybrid exception would cover the situation exemplified by Smith, since free
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claim seriously. To date, many courts have not.111
2. Smith’s attempts to distinguish other
conflicting unemployment cases also fail.
It is also unclear, under the majority’s unemployment compensation
standard, why Smith and Black lost. The Smith majority acknowledged
that the compelling interest test was appropriate in the unemployment
context.112 Yet the Court seemingly forgot that the case was an
unemployment case—not a criminal prosecution. The Court
acknowledged that it had prevented states many times from applying
unemployment compensation rules that conflicted with a person’s
religion.113 The Court cited three of the four cases, but oddly omitted the
most recent.114 These are prime examples of cases in which the Free
Exercise Clause exempted individuals from generally applicable laws
based on religion.
Smith tried to distinguish these cases in general by arguing that the
compelling interest test had never invalidated government action “except
[for] the denial of unemployment compensation.”115 The majority claimed
that the unemployment compensation context involves the
“individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for [a person’s]
relevant conduct.”116 Thus, the Court stated that “the unemployment cases
stand for the proposition that where the State has in place a system of
individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of
‘religious hardship’ without compelling reason.”117
Yet Smith was an unemployment compensation case. It involved
individualized government assessments. The criminal question was
merely hypothetical. Even if the case were a criminal case, the State
would have still needed to individually assess the defendants’ motives and
actions.118 Thus, the distinction Smith posited does not support the
speech and associational rights are certainly implicated in the peyote ritual.
Id.; see also McConnell, supra note 23, at 1122 (arguing Smith implicated a hybrid free exercise and free
speech claim).
111. E.g., Knight v. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 275 F.3d 156, 167 (2d Cir. 2001) (refusing to
recognize hybrid rights); Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993) (same).
112. Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883 (1990).
113. Id.
114. Id. (citing Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Rev.
Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)) (omitting Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp.
Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989)).
115. Smith, 494 U.S. at 883.
116. Id. at 884.
117. Id.
118. See United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 131 (1980) (“In the criminal law, both a
culpable mens rea and a criminal actus reus are generally required for an offense to occur.”).
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majority’s conclusion. Even if it did, it is hard to cabin the distinction to
the unemployment compensation context. Due process requires an
individualized hearing in many contexts—not just for unemployment
benefits.119 An individualized governmental assessment is also necessary
in most free exercise cases.120 The majority’s argument beggars belief.
E. Smith rests on the majority’s dubious policy preferences.
Although the Smith majority claimed that it relied on precedent, neither
text nor precedent supports its decision.121 The decision rests on the
majority’s policy argument that religious freedom would cause harm.122
The majority recognized that its decision would abandon religious liberty
and “disadvantage” religious minorities.123 It claimed that this result is an
“unavoidable consequence of democratic government,” and it is
preferable to the alternatives.124 If religion excused believers from general
laws, the majority argued: (1) society “would be courting anarchy”
because it would allow each conscience to become a law unto itself;125
and (2) judges would have to “weigh the social importance of all laws
against the centrality of all religious beliefs.”126 Yet neither hypothetical
harm justifies the majority’s decision.
1. Smith’s anarchy argument fails.
The majority’s first fear is based on a circular and false assumption.
The hypothetical question before the Supreme Court was whether the
Constitution—the supreme law—protects religious exercise from general
laws.127 The Smith majority argued it does not because “[a]ny society
adopting such a system,” according to the majority, “would be courting
anarchy.”128 This begs the question: if the Constitution protects religious
exercise from general laws, then it is not lawless to apply the Constitution
correctly. Nor is it accurate to claim that believers subvert the law if the
119. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332–33 (1976) (noting due process requires a hearing
before the government finally deprives a person’s liberty or property interest); Francis C. Amendola et
al., Due Process Right to Notice and Hearing, in 16C C.J.S. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1873 (2022) (“Due
process requires some form or kind of hearing before an individual is deprived of a protected right,
interest, or benefit.”).
120. McConnell, supra note 23, at 1123.
121. See infra Section I(C), Section I(D).
122. Id. at 1129.
123. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 888
126. Id. at 890.
127. Id. at 874.
128. Id. at 888.
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supreme law requires religious exemptions. If the Free Exercise Clause—
as it says—removes the government’s ability to prohibit religious
exercise, it is the government that acts lawlessly when it prohibits
religious exercise—not the believer.
The ultimate question is whether the Free Exercise Clause provides
substantive protection and therefore requires exemptions from general
laws. The Smith majority, however, fails to answer that question. It merely
concludes, “we do not think the words must be given that meaning.”129
The majority simply assumes its conclusion. And the anarchy policy
argument that it gives to support its conclusion circularly depends on the
conclusion. Thus, the argument is logically flawed.
The anarchy argument also fails empirically. The majority presumed
that anarchy results if the Free Exercise Clause protects believers from
general laws.130 Yet religious liberty did not create anarchy before Smith.
Since the founding, our nation has shown its commitment to religious
freedom through an unbroken tradition of religious exemptions.131
When the Supreme Court decided Smith, many recognized
constitutional exemptions existed along with more than two thousand
legislative exemptions.132 Yet the majority provided no evidence that
religious exemptions create anarchy. It merely argued that adopting free
exercise exemptions “would be courting anarchy,” and “open the prospect
of [anarchy].”133 The majority also admitted that the Supreme Court itself
exempted individuals from general education laws and unemployment
laws based on religion.134 Yet it could not point to any ill effects from
those exemptions.
Time has confirmed that the majority’s policy argument is wrong.
Religious exemptions have not led to anarchy since Smith. Congress—
along with twenty-three states135—responded to Smith by enacting
129. Id. at 878.
130. Id. at 888.
131. Douglas Laycock, Regulatory Exemptions of Religious Behavior and the Original
Understanding of the Establishment Clause, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1793, 1837 (2006).
132. The Supreme Court on at least five occasions mandated free exercise exemptions. See cases
cited supra note 71. Professor Laycock cites evidence, based on a Lexis search and sampling techniques,
estimating that 2,000 religious exemptions from state and federal laws existed in 1992. Laycock, supra
note 131, at 1837 (citing James E. Ryan, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An
Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1445 n.215 (1992)).
133. Smith, 494 U.S. at 888 (emphasis added).
134. See cases cited supra note 71.
135. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3.01; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1493.01 (1999); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 16-123-401, et seq. (2020); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-571b (1993), FLA. STAT. § 761.01, et seq. (1998);
IDAHO CODE § 73-402 (2000); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/1, et seq. (West 1998); IND. CODE § 3413-9-0.7, et seq. (2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5301, et seq. (2013); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.350
(West 2013); LA. STAT. ANN. § 13:5231, et seq. (2010); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 11-61-1 (2014); MO. REV.
STAT. § 1.302 (2003); Mont. Laws ch. 276 (SB 215) (2021); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-22-1, et seq. (2000);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 251, et seq (2000); 71 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. § 2403 (West 2002); 42 R.I.
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RFRAs and other laws to protect religious liberty.136 These laws require
what the Smith majority claimed would lead to anarchy.137 They prevent
the government from substantially burdening religious exercise unless it
shows that “the burden to the person—(1) is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of
furthering that compelling governmental interest.”138 At least fourteen
state courts have also rejected Smith and decided that their state free
exercise clauses afford similar protection.139 Yet after nearly thirty years
with these religious freedom protections, anarchy has not occurred.
Smith’s anarchy prediction is wrong: religious liberty does not cause
anarchy. Far from it, it allows people with conflicting beliefs to live
together in peace.
Experience shows that governments can often accommodate religious
individuals without problems. Idaho, for example, could have easily
accommodated Ricks. Idaho allows Social Security substitutes in other
licensing contexts.140 It just did not care whether Ricks could follow his
faith. Ricks shows that religious minorities often face problems—from
indifference or hostility—and need protection from general laws. Smith
worsens the problem. Smith sanctions indifference and veiled hostility:
governments need not care or grant minor exceptions so individuals can
practice their faith. Smith abandons constitutional protections for
religious individuals based on imaginary problems that have not occurred.
If the Smith majority had consulted history, it would have recognized
that its anarchy rationale was not new—our Founders considered and
rejected it. Roger Williams and William Penn both dismissed this claim
in the seventeenth century.141 In Penn’s The Great Case of Liberty of
Conscience, for example, he called the anarchy claim “fully
ridiculous.”142 Penn wrote that religious liberty did not excuse believers
from “keeping those excellent Laws, that tend to Sober, Just, and

GEN. LAWS ANN. § 42-80.1-1, et seq. (West 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-32-10, et seq. (1999); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 1-1A-4 (2021); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-407 (West 2018); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 110.001, et seq. (West 1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 57-2.02 (West 2007).
136. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb4 (1993); American Indian
Religious Freedom Act Amendments, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1996–1996b (1994) (protecting religiously motivated
peyote use); Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-5
(2000).
137. Smith, 494 U.S. at 888.
138. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1993).
139. Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 839, 844 n.22
(2014) (citing cases).
140. IDAHO CODE § 73-122 (1999).
141. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1447–48 (1990).
142. Id. at 1447 (updated spelling).
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Industrious Living.”143 In other words, Penn recognized the government
has a strong interest—in modern parlance, a compelling interest—in some
cases to refuse to exempt believers from certain general laws.
In the eighteenth century, John Leland also rejected the anarchy
argument.144 Leland led the Virginia Baptists and helped secure
constitutional protections for religion.145 He condemned the assertion that
religious liberty would justify crimes such as murder and tax evasion.146
He argued, “when a man is a peaceable subject of state, he should be
protected in worshipping the Deity according to the dictates of his own
conscience.”147
These arguments for religious liberty ultimately won. The Founders did
not consider religious freedom dangerous—they universally protected
it.148 When general laws conflicted with religion, the Founders solved the
conflict through religious exemptions.149 The Founders viewed religious
liberty as a solution—not a problem.
2. Smith’s judicial balancing argument fails.
The majority’s second fear was that religious liberty would require
judges to balance “the social importance of all laws against the centrality
of all religious beliefs.”150 It assumed that little to no religious liberty is
better than judges balancing law and religion. 151 But concerns about
judicial balancing do not justify (i) rewriting the Free Exercise Clause;
(ii) abandoning the Court’s role; (iii) inflicting religious harm; (iv)
eliminating free exercise exemptions; and (v) sacrificing religious
minorities. The scale tips the opposite way.
i. The majority engaged in judicial balancing
to prohibit judicial balancing.
The majority engaged in the ultimate judicial balancing act. Unelected

143. Id. at 1448.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1448, 1476–77 (noting that Leland led the Virginia Baptists who supported Madison
after he endorsed constitutional protection for religious liberty, and they contributed to Madison’s narrow
margin of victory for the first U.S. Congress). The religion clauses were promoted by “the most fervent
and evangelical denominations in the nation,” particularly the Baptists. Id. at 1437.
146. Id. at 1448.
147. Id. (emphasis added).
148. See infra Section II(C).
149. See infra Section II(C)(4).
150. Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
151. Id. at 889 n.5 ([I] it is horrible to contemplate that federal judges will regularly balance against
the importance of general laws the significance of religious practice.”).
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judges ignored and rewrote the Free Exercise Clause based on their policy
preferences. Because they thought the Founders’ decision to prevent the
government from “prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]”152 was
imprudent, they reinterpreted it. The majority showed no reticence to
engage in judicial balancing or fear that it might reach the wrong result.
ii. The majority abandoned the Court’s
role to avoid judicial balancing.
The Founders created a judicial system in part to protect minorities
from majoritarian oppression.153 They created the Bill of Rights,
moreover, to avoid certain “consequence[s]”154 of democratic
government.155 The Bill of Rights secures fundamental rights from
majority dependence and interference. As Justice Jackson wrote in
Barnette:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from
the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of
majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be
applied by the courts. One’s right to . . . freedom of worship . . . may not
be submitted to vote; [it] depend[s] on the outcome of no elections.156

Smith turns this fundamental understanding on its head and leaves
freedom of worship to the political process.157 Disadvantaging minority
religions is not “unavoidable”158 if courts enforce a robust Free Exercise
Clause.
Smith erred by turning religious freedom over to the political process.
The Founders recognized that the political majority cannot be trusted to
protect religious liberty.159 Legislators represent the majority and are
vulnerable to lobbyists and political pressure. 160 Judges are, or at least
should be, different.161 They are at least sometimes willing to protect

152. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
153. McConnell, supra note 23, at 1129.
154. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
155. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
156. Id.
157. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
158. Id.
159. Thus, the Founders enacted a federal Free Exercise Clause and constitutional free exercise
provisions in each state. See infra Section II(C)(1).
160. Douglas Laycock, The Religious Exemption Debate, 11 RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION 139, 160–
62 (2009).
161. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, (Thomas, J., concurring) 575 U.S. 92, 120 (2015) (“One
of the key elements of the Federalists’ arguments in support of [the judiciary’s power] to make binding
interpretations of the law was that Article III judges would exercise independent judgment”).
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unpopular minorities.162 Legislators, on the other hand, are seldom willing
to, because they cannot afford to protect groups that voters disfavor. Thus,
legislators “are least likely to protect those religious minorities who are
most in need of protection.”163
iii. The majority inflicted religious harm
to avoid judicial balancing.
Judicial balancing is a constitutional norm.164 There is no reason to
believe judges are more prone to err when they apply the Free Exercise
Clause than when they apply another constitutional provision. The Smith
majority’s opinion suggests that the special problem with religion is that
it requires judges to evaluate religious claims’ relative merits.165 This
harm, even when judges err, is far less injurious than Smith’s alternative.
Rather than weigh the religious claim in Smith, the majority allowed
Oregon to prohibit a central tenet of the Native American Church without
a justification.166 It is hard to see how judicial balancing—a common
judicial practice—is worse. The plaintiffs in Smith did not think so. The
government deprived them of their right to exercise their religion.
iv. The majority ended free exercise exemptions
to avoid judicial balancing.
To avoid judicial balancing, the majority eliminated free exercise
exemptions. The majority argued that it would be a constitutional
anomaly to exempt believers under the Free Exercise Clause from
generally applicable laws.167 This is untrue. Individual exemptions are not
a free exercise anomaly. A constitutional as-applied challenge is a precise
parallel.168 Under an as-applied ruling, a court protects a constitutional
right but otherwise leaves the challenged law in place. Moreover, contrary
to Smith, exemptions from general laws are well-established protections
under the First Amendment for free speech and press. 169
Religion, however, is anomalous because general laws uniquely
162. Laycock, supra note 160, at 163.
163. Id.
164. McConnell, supra note 23, at 1144.
165. Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886–87 (1990).
166. Id. at 889–90.
167. Id. at 886.
168. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1916–17 (2021) (Alito, J., concurring);
McConnell, supra note 23, at 1138; Stephanie H. Barclay & Mark L. Rienzi, Constitutional Anomalies or
As-Applied Challenges? A Defense of Religious Exemptions, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1595, 1611 (2018).
169. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1916–17 (Alito, J., concurring) (listing cases); McConnell, supra note 23,
at 1138; Barclay & Rienzi, supra note 168, at 1611.
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endanger it.170 Unlike other rights, general laws often capture religion
because religion involves conduct. When general laws do affect religion,
they distinctly harm it. General laws may abridge free speech, for
example, but there are normally other means for the speaker to share his
message.171 When individuals are prohibited from practicing their
religion, no alternative means exist to practice it. For Native American
Church members in Oregon after Smith, no alternative legal means exist
to exercise their religion.172 General laws uniquely burden believers and
require them to violate their religious identity. Free exercise exemptions
are not unusual—they are a sensible solution to protect believers.
v. The majority sacrificed religious minorities
to avoid judicial balancing.
Finally, to avoid judicial balancing, Smith sacrificed religious
minorities.173 In doing so, the majority ignored the constitutional directive
for denominational neutrality. Supreme Court precedent and history
confirm that the “clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that
one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over
another.”174 Under Smith, however, powerful religious groups can obtain
legislative exemptions. They can secure the right to practice their faith.
Powerless religious groups cannot: thus, they have no right to practice
their faith.
The Establishment Clause cannot fix this disparity because
accommodation is just as easily accomplished by legislative inaction as
action.175 Legislatures do not usually pass laws that conflict with religious
beliefs held by the majority. For example, if the majority shared Ricks’s
religious beliefs, the State would not require a Social Security number to
register, or it would create an exception. A vigorous Free Exercise Clause
is the best way to protect religious minorities.176 Smith, however, rejects
that solution and leaves minorities vulnerable—who need constitutional
protection most.
Although religious liberty may be imperfect, like any other human
endeavor, it is preferable to evenhanded repression. Of course, there is a
possibility that judges will err. But that possibility does not justify

170. Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and A Response to the
Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 692 (1992).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (admitting it would “disadvantage” minorities).
174. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982).
175. McConnell, supra note 23, at 1132.
176. Id.
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abandoning the constitutional requirement to protect religious liberty.
II: THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
The Free Exercise Clause provides a substantive right to freely exercise
religion: it prohibits the government from interfering with religious
exercise. This is a sensible solution. General laws and discriminatory laws
can equally prohibit religious exercise.
A. Smith conflicts with the Free Exercise Clause’s text.
Smith contradicts the Free Exercise Clause. The Free Exercise Clause’s
text is absolute. It provides that “Congress shall make no law . . .
prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].”177 Other constitutional clauses
have limiting terms. For example, security against “unreasonable
searches and seizures,” “due process of law,” “excessive bail,” and “cruel
and unusual punishments.”178 The Free Exercise Clause, on the other
hand, does not have any limiting terms. Like protections for free speech
and free press, the Constitution unconditionally protects religious free
exercise. To remain textually faithful, exceptions should be narrow
because the text supplies none.179 The text’s absolute prohibition,
moreover, requires the government to prove an exception from the rule is
necessary to lawfully burden religious practice.
The Smith majority’s interpretation, however, replaces the absolute
rule with an unwritten, absolute exception: the government can prohibit
religious exercise if it acts neutrally and generally.180 The exception
swallows the rule and allows the government to prohibit the “free exercise
[of religion]” without providing a reason.181 The majority’s interpretation
as a textual matter is untenable. It is difficult, if not impossible, to arrive
at the majority’s conclusion from the text. An average reader, now or in
the eighteenth century, would not conclude that the text allows the
government to prohibit religious exercise if it equally prohibits religious
and nonreligious conduct.
The Free Exercise Clause provides substantive protection. It guarantees
the right to freely exercise religion—not merely the right to equal
treatment. It does not say, for example that “Congress shall make no law

177. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
178. U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V, VIII (emphasis added). For further discussion about the reasons
for this absolute protection, see Stephen Pepper, Taking the Free Exercise Clause Seriously, 1986 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 299, 300 (1986).
179. McConnell, supra note 23, at 1116.
180. Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
181. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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discriminating against religion.”182 Nor does it say: “Congress shall make
no law prohibiting the free exercise of religion unless such law is neutral
and generally applicable.” It says that “Congress shall make no law . . .
prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].”183 The Constitution allows the
government to prohibit many things. But it bars the government from
prohibiting religious exercise.184 This is a substantive protection from
government interference with religion.
If the Founders intended to create a free exercise exception for general
laws that restrict religion, they knew how to do it. The Founders
understood English. And they had statutory examples that used general
laws as limiting principles readily available.185 The English statute that
controlled religious and civil laws’ reach within the Church of England is
a prime example.186 That statute provided that religious law governed
unless it was “repugnant to the laws, statutes, and customs of this realm,
[or damaged or hurt] the King’s prerogative.”187 If the Founders intended
to create an exception to the Free Exercise Clause for neutral and
generally applicable laws, “they would have used familiar language.” 188
They did not. They protected religious exercise without exception.
B. Smith conflicts with the Free Exercise Clause’s purpose.
The Founders created the Free Exercise Clause to preserve religious
liberty and prevent religious persecution and conflict. Smith contradicts
these goals.
Religious liberty reduces human suffering—it liberates individuals
from the cruel choice between “incurring legal penalties and surrendering
core parts of their identity.”189 Religion is important to believers—
important enough to suffer and die for.190 Governmental acts that prohibit
religion therefore produce conflict and suffering and seldom convert
earnest believers. 191 As Madison wrote in his Memorial and
Remonstrance: governments have spilled “torrents of blood” in “vain
182. Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 13 (1990).
183. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
184. Laycock, supra note 182, at 13.
185. See Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1898 (2021) (Alito, J., concurring) (noting
the Founders did not use equal protection language either, even though other constitutional provisions and
several earlier free exercise provisions included equal protection language).
186. Michael W. McConnell, Freedom from Persecution or Protection of the Rights of
Conscience?: A Critique of Justice Scalia’s Historical Arguments in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 819, 836 (1998).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Laycock, supra note 139, at 842.
190. Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313, 317 (1996).
191. Id.
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attempts” to achieve uniformity and forbid disapproved religious
practices.192 Madison argued “the true remedy” for religious conflict is
“equal and complete [religious] liberty.”193
Indeed, religious accommodation, or “relaxation” in Madison’s words,
from “narrow and rigorous policy, wherever it has been tried, has been
found to assuage [religious struggles].”194 The Founders discovered that
there is less reason for religious conflict if everyone can practice his
religion freely.195 Thus, they created the Free Exercise Clause.
Smith undermines the Free Exercise Clause by permitting religious
persecution. Equal protection is not enough. Imagine a tyrant who
suppresses everyone’s right to exercise religion. He would achieve perfect
equality, but, of course, no religious liberty.196 This illustration shows the
grave error the majority committed.197
In essense, Smith abolishes religious liberty. Minorities cannot practice
their religion if the majority passes a generally applicable law that
prohibits it. Smith allows Native American Church members in Oregon,
and individuals like Ricks in Idaho, to hold their religious beliefs. But
they cannot practice them. If they do, Smith allows the government to
punish them. Thus, Smith’s equal protection rule is hollow. It permits the
government to persecute believers for practicing their faith.198
Moreover, Smith ensures conflict because it allows the majority to
suppress religious practices. Believers must fight—and win—social and
political battles to protect their religious identity. If they lose, even once,
the majority may prohibit them from practicing their religion. Rather than
religious liberty for all, Smith arms the government with the power to
prohibit religious conduct that the ruling class dislikes.
When governments prohibit religious conduct, contrary to Smith, it is
immaterial whether they use a law aimed at religion or a law that is
otherwise neutral towards religion.199 Both laws achieve the same result.
For a Quaker during the seventeenth century, it would have made little
difference if Massachusetts passed a law that prohibited Quakers from the
colony or a general law that required everyone to serve in the military and
swear oaths. A conscientious Quaker could not live in Massachusetts if
192. MADISON, supra note 15.
193. Id. (updated spelling).
194. Id.
195. Laycock, supra note 139, at 842.
196. Laycock, supra note 192, at 13–14.
197. Id.
198. Laycock, supra note 160, at 176.
199. Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 901 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“There is nothing
talismanic about neutral laws of general applicability or general criminal prohibitions, for laws neutral
toward religion can coerce a person to violate his religious conscience or intrude upon his religious duties
just as effectively as laws aimed at religion.”).
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he had to serve in the military or swear oaths.200 If a Quaker did live there,
conflict and persecution would have resulted under either law. Both laws
would have empowered the government to arrest and imprison Quakers.
General laws that ban religious practices ban believers. 201
Smith draws its line in the same place that Oliver Cromwell did in the
seventeenth century.202 Cromwell told the Catholics in Ireland that they
could believe, but they could not practice their faith.203 Cromwell
promised not to interfere with any Catholic person’s conscience, but he
prohibited Catholic mass.204 The Smith majority similarly prohibited
Native American Church ceremonies.205 The majority declared that
individuals have no substantive right to practice their religion.206
Although Smith’s equal protection rule would have prevented Cromwell
from expressly outlawing Catholic mass, Smith allows government acts
that would achieve the same result.207 Under Smith, Cromwell could have
forbidden consuming wine and thereby lawfully prohibited traditional
Catholic mass.208
The Founders enacted the Free Exercise Clause, at the very least, to
prevent religious conflicts like the English Civil War.209 The Founders
did not intend a free exercise provision that permits Cromwellian
persecution where the majority may lawfully suppress minority
religions.210 The majority in Smith, however, rewrote the Free Exercise
Clause to potentially allow for just that. Under Smith, Protestants who win
a civil war may lawfully suppress Catholic mass, and groups who win
political battles may lawfully suppress minority religions.211
The Founders recognized that a substantive right to freely exercise
religion reduces conflict.212 It solves the dilemma that many religious
minorities face: their faith tells them one thing, but the law requires
another. A substantive right to exercise religion requires the government
to accommodate religion, whenever possible, so religious individuals can
serve God and government. Smith, however, disregards this dilemma for
religious individuals. As a result, religious individuals like Ricks are
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Laycock, supra note 160, at 150.
Id.
Laycock, supra note 182, at 22.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
MADISON, supra note 15.
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forced to choose between the government and God. If Ricks works as a
contractor and maintains his faith, he faces fines and jail.213
Smith thereby turns principled citizens into criminals for following
their faith. Smith rejects the difference between religious believers—who
cannot comply with a law because of their religion—and ordinary
criminals who simply do not comply with a law. Under Smith, “[a] soldier
who believes he must cover his head before an omnipresent God is
constitutionally indistinguishable from a soldier who wants to wear a
Budweiser gimme cap.”214 And a believer who consumes wine or ingests
peyote during communion receives no more constitutional protection
under Smith than a recreational drug or alcohol user.215 Smith treats all
these individuals the same. Thus, Smith allows the state to criminalize the
free exercise of religion.
C. Smith conflicts with the Free Exercise Clause’s original meaning.
Smith contradicts the Free Exercise Clause’s original meaning. The
intellectual context at the founding and the free exercise principle’s
development and application confirm that the text protects a broad,
substantive right to practice religion.
1. Smith conflicts with the intellectual context at the founding.
The founding generation considered religious liberty an unalienable
right.216 Every state, except Connecticut, had a constitutional provision
protecting religious liberty before the federal Bill of Rights.217 Four states
affirmed in their constitutions that religious liberty is an “unalienable
right,”218 and four others proposed a federal amendment that said the
same.219 The Founders, in comparison, often considered other rights in
state bills of rights, such as the right to own property and the right to trial
by jury, alienable rights that depend on civil society.220 In contrast, they
universally considered religious freedom an unalienable right.

213. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 1, Ricks v. State Contractors Bd., 141 S. Ct. 2850 (2021)
(No. 19-66).
214. Laycock, supra note 182, at 11.
215. Id. at 11, 16.
216. McConnell, supra note 141, at 1456.
217. Id. at 1455.
218. The four states are Delaware, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania. See infra
text accompanying notes 319, 323, 326, 327.
219. New York, Virginia, Rhode Island, and North Carolina proposed a constitutional amendment
declaring that people have an “unalienable right” to exercise religion “according to the dictates of
conscience.” McConnell, supra note 141, at 1480–81 n.360.
220. Id. at 1456 n.238 (citing Madison and Jefferson).
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The Founders considered conscience inviolable. This idea is the
primary reason given at the founding for religious liberty.221 James
Madison perhaps most famously articulated this account in his Memorial
and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments.222 There, he explained
that religious liberty is “in its nature an unalienable right” because it “is a
duty towards the Creator”—not merely “a right towards men.” 223
Madison wrote that every person owes a duty to God that must be
individually determined.224 “This duty is precedent,” according to
Madison, “both in order of time and in degree of obligation, to the claims
of Civil Society.”225
Individuals do not surrender this duty to God when they enter society.
Before a person joins society, Madison wrote, “he must be considered as
a subject of the Governor of the Universe.”226 So when he enters civil
society, he “must always do it with a reservation of his duty to the General
Authority.”227 And when a person joins a particular civil society, he must
“do it with a saving of his allegiance to the Universal Sovereign.” 228
Madison maintained that “Religion is wholly exempt from [Civil
Society’s] cognizance.”229 The government lacks authority to interfere
with a person’s religion, which Madison defined as “the duty which we
owe to our Creator and the manner of discharging it.”230 Because “religion
[is] exempt from the authority of the Society at large,” Madison reasoned
“still less can it be subject to that of the Legislative Body.”231 Government
power, according to Madison, is limited: government branches may not
invade other branches or peoples’ rights.232 Government officials who do
so “exceed the commission from which they derive their authority, and
are Tyrants.”233 Thus, the government exceeds its authority and acts
tyrannically when it regulates religion.
The Founders protected religion based on this intellectual context and
understanding.234 They did not consider religious liberty a nondiscrimination principle, nor did they protect religion to achieve religious

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

McConnell, supra note 186, at 823.
Id. at 823–24.
MADISON, supra note 15.
Id.
Id.
Id. (updated spelling).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
McConnell, supra note 186, at 823–24.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol91/iss2/3

26

Hutchison: Revisiting Employment Division v. Smith

422

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 91

equality.235 They considered religious liberty an unalienable right. Each
person has an irrevocable duty to God, determined by conscience, that is
“precedent . . . to the claims of Civil Society.”236 This theory underlies the
Free Exercise Clause, and it corresponds with a broad, substantive right
to practice religion.
Smith contradicts this original understanding. It reverses the
relationship between God and government. Smith rests on the theory that
duties to civil society supersede duties to God—contrary to Madison’s
account. And it converts an unalienable right from God into an alienable
right that depends on government.237 Under Smith, the government can
regulate religion—and even prohibit it—if the government acts equally.
2. Smith conflicts with the free exercise principle
developed in the colonies.
The free exercise of religion developed as a legal concept in the
American colonies. 238 The term “free exercise” appeared in a legal
document in 1648 when Lord Baltimore ordered Maryland officials not
to disrupt Christians—Catholics in particular—in the free exercise of
their religion.239 One year later, Maryland enacted the first colonial free
exercise clause. 240 It stated:
[N]o person . . . professing to believe in Jesus Christ, shall from henceforth
be any ways troubled . . . for . . . his or her religion nor in the free exercise
thereof . . . nor any way be compelled to the belief or exercise of any other
Religion against his or her consent.241

Rhode Island also protected religious liberty but used the equivalent
term liberty of conscience. 242 Its 1663 Charter protected residents from
being “molested, punished, disquieted, or called in question, for any
differences in opinion in matters of religion [that] do not actually disturb
235. See MADISON, supra note 15.
236. Id.
237. Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888, 890 (1990) (calling free exercise exemptions a
“luxury” and “leaving accommodation to the political process”).
238. McConnell, supra note 141, at 1425.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. An Act Concerning Religion (1649), reprinted in 1 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND ONLINE:
PROCEEDINGS AND ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF MARYLAND 1637–1664, at 244–77 (William
Hand Browne ed., Baltimore, Maryland Historical Society 1883) (updated spelling),
https://msa.maryland.gov/megafile/msa/speccol/sc2900/sc2908/000001/000001/html/am1--244.html.
For the full text, see infra Appendix A: Colonial Free Exercise Clauses.
242. Charter of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations (1663), reprinted in 6 FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 3213
(Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) (updated spelling)., https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/thorpe-the-federaland-state-constitutions-vol-vi-porto-rico-vermont.
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the civil peace of our said colony.”243 The Charter also guaranteed that
individuals may “freely and fully have and enjoy his and their own
judgments and consciences, in matters of religious concernments . . . ;
they behaving themselves peaceably and quietly, and not using this liberty
to licentiousness and profaneness, nor to the civil injury or outward
disturbance of others.”244 The Carolina and New Jersey proprietors used
almost identical language to protect religious freedom.245
The Rhode Island Charter notably deviated from an earlier legislative
decree that made religious freedom subject to general laws.246 That decree
stated that inhabitants could practice their religion “[p]rovided, it be not
directly repugnant to [the] government or laws established.”247 The Royal
Charter, however, did not limit religious freedom by all “laws
established.” It only limited religious freedom by laws needed to maintain
peace.248 Thus, believers could exercise their religion unless it conflicted
with a law needed for peace or was licentious, profane, or injured others.
Carolina’s Charter similarly protected religious liberty like Rhode
Island’s Charter. 249 But it also explicitly provided for religious
exemptions. The Carolina Charter authorized proprietors to grant
“indulgences” and “dispensations” to residents who could not “conform”
with the general law because of their “private opinions.”250 Indulgences
and dispensations were technical terms that referred to the king’s power
to exempt citizens from the law.251 In England, Charles II and James II

243. Id. (updated spelling).
244. Id. (updated spelling).
245. The New Jersey proprietors agreed: “[N]o person . . . shall be” troubled or “punished” for any
religious “opinion or practice” that does “not actually disturb the civil peace.” Every person may “freely”
use his religious “judgments and consciences . . . peaceably and quietly, and not using this liberty to
licentiousness, nor to the civil injury or outward disturbance of others.” The Concession and Agreement
of the Lords Proprietors of the Province of New Caesarea, or New Jersey (1664), reprinted in 5 FEDERAL
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 242, at 2537, https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/thorpe-the-federaland-state-constitutions-vol-v-new-jersey-philippine-islands. For the New Jersey and Carolina
agreements’ full text, see infra text accompanying notes 315, 317.
246. Government of Rhode Island—March 16–19, 1641, reprinted in 6 FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 242, at 3208, https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/thorpe-the-federal-and-stateconstitutions-vol-vi-porto-rico-vermont.
247. Id. (updated spelling).
248. Id.
249. The Carolina Charter provided: “[N]o person . . . shall be” troubled or “punished” for any
religious “opinion, or practice” that does “not actually disturb the civil peace.” Every person may “freely”
use his religious “judgments and consciences . . . peaceably and quietly, and not using this liberty to
licentiousness, nor to the civil injury, or outward disturbance of others.” Charter of Carolina (1665),
reprinted in 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 242, at 2771,
https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/thorpe-the-federal-and-state-constitutions-vol-v-new-jersey-philippineislands.
250. Id.
251. McConnell, supra note 141, at 1428.
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used this power to exempt religious minorities from conflicting laws.252
In Carolina, proprietors used this authority to exempt Quakers from oath
requirements and to allow non-Anglican towns to choose their own
ministers.253 Thus, as in England, exemptions resolved conflicts between
law and religion.
These colonial provisions reveal at least two features about the early
free exercise principle. First, the free exercise principle protects belief and
practice. The colonial provisions extended protection to all religious
“judgments and consciences” and religious “exercise” and “practice.”254
They did not limit protection to religious beliefs, opinions,
communications, or worship.255 This suggests that the American colonists
considered the freedom to practice religion an essential liberty.
Second, the free exercise principle provides protection from general
laws. The colonists did not use general laws—or similar terms—as
limiting principles for religious exercise. Colonial compacts often used
terms such as “the public good” or “the common good” to convey the full
extent of legislative power.256 Colonial free exercise provisions did not
use such terms. Rather, these provisions limited the free exercise of
religion only when necessary to keep the peace or to prevent
licentiousness or injury to others.
Thus, the colonial free exercise principle prohibits the government
from interfering with religion unless vital interests require it. This early
framework parallels the standard the Supreme Court expressed in
Sherbert v. Verner257 and Wisconsin v. Yoder258 but ignored in Smith:
“[t]he essence of all that has been said and written on the subject is that
only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served
can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.”259
3. Smith conflicts with the free exercise principle
protected by early state constitutions.
The colonial free exercise principle animated the free exercise clauses
enacted in state constitutions.260 The state clauses followed the colonial
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. See supra notes 241–250.
255. McConnell, supra note 141, at 1427.
256. McConnell, supra note 186, at 836.
257. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (requiring a “compelling state interest” and
stating, “only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible [free
exercise] limitation” (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945))).
258. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
259. Id.
260. McConnell, supra note 141, at 1427.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2022

29

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 91, Iss. 2 [2022], Art. 3

2022]

REVISITING EMPLOYMENT DIVISION V. SMITH

425

free exercise pattern: they “guaranteed free exercise of religion or liberty
of conscience, limited by particular, defined state interests.”261
i. State free exercise clauses provided
substantive protection from general laws.
State free exercise clauses further show how the founding generation
understood the free exercise principle. The people who drafted and
adopted the federal clause would have been familiar with the free exercise
principle from state and colonial free exercise provisions. Many Founders
who participated at the federal level were also involved at the state
level.262 Madison, for example, helped draft both the Virginia Free
Exercise Clause and the federal Free Exercise Clause. 263 It is reasonable
to infer that the term, “free exercise of religion,” in the First Amendment
meant what it meant in earlier state and colonial provisions.264
The New York Constitution’s Free Exercise Clause exemplifies many
of its contemporary provisions.265 The clause granted broad protection
with limited exceptions:
[T]he free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever hereafter be allowed,
within this State, to all mankind: Provided, That the liberty of conscience,
hereby granted, shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of
licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of
this State.266

New Hampshire similarly protected religious freedom limited by
narrow exceptions:
Every individual has a natural and unalienable right to worship GOD
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and reason; and no subject
shall be hurt, molested, or restrained in his person, liberty or estate for
worshipping GOD, in the manner and season most agreeable to the dictates
of his own conscience, . . . provided he doth not disturb the public peace,
or disturb others, in their religious worship. 267
261. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 553 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
262. Id. at 560.
263. McConnell, supra note 141, at 1463, 1480.
264. Flores, 521 U.S. at 560 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
265. For the full text for every state free exercise clause at the First Amendment’s adoption, see
infra Appendix B: State Free Exercise Clauses.
266. N.Y. CONST of1777, reprinted in 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 242, at
2636–37,
https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/thorpe-the-federal-and-state-constitutions-vol-v-new-jerseyphilippine-islands.
267. N.H. CONST of1784, reprinted in 4 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 242, at
2454, https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/thorpe-the-federal-and-state-constitutions-vol-iv-michigan-new-ha
mpshire.
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Other states generally followed the same pattern. 268 They broadly
protected free exercise first, based on the individual believer’s
understanding (conscience). 269 They did not define the right negatively by
identifying religious and nonreligious domains. Moreover, the right
protected religiously motivated conduct. No state provision confined the
free exercise right to beliefs and opinions.270 Six provisions used the word
“exercise,” which dictionaries then defined as “action.”271 Two other
provisions used broader terms: Maryland used the term religious
“practice” and Rhode Island used the term matters of “religious
concernment.”272
After state free exercise clauses protected the broad right, they
identified narrow interests that allowed the state to restrict the free
exercise of religion. Nine states—the overwhelming majority—limited
the free exercise of religion to “peaceable” actions or actions that would
not disturb the state’s “peace” or “safety.”273 The Georgia Constitution,
for example, provided: “All persons whatever shall have the free exercise
of their religion; provided it be not repugnant to the peace and safety of
the State.”274
The limitations are instructive. They confirm that the free exercise right
protects religiously motivated conduct from general laws. Beliefs, by
themselves, do not disturb the peace.275 More important, if every general
law limited religious exercise, there would have been no need to identify
the laws and interests that limit the right. The New York Constitution, for
instance, stated that the free exercise of religion should not be “construed
as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with
the peace or safety of [the] State.”276 If Smith were correct, such a
limitation would have been superfluous. Precise limitations are pointless
if the free exercise of religion is subject to all generally applicable laws.
The limitations only make sense if the free exercise principle protects
religion from most generally applicable laws.277
268. See infra Appendix B: State Free Exercise Clauses.
269. McConnell, supra note 141, at 1458–59.
270. Id. at 1459.
271. The states are Delaware, Georgia, New York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Virginia. Id.; see
infra text accompanying notes 319–320, 325, 329–330.
272. See infra text accompanying notes 321, 328.
273. The states are Delaware, Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, Rhode Island, and South Carolina. See infra text accompanying notes 319-325, 328-329.
274. GA. CONST. of 1777, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 242, at
784, https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/thorpe-the-federal-and-state-constitutions-vol-ii-florida-kansas.
275. McConnell, supra note 141, at 1462.
276. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, reprinted in 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 242,
at 2637, https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/thorpe-the-federal-and-state-constitutions-vol-v-new-jerseyphilippine-islands.
277. McConnell, supra note 141, at 1462.
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ii. The limiting terms in state free exercise clauses
did not mean general laws.
The argument that these limitations were synonyms for the public
interest, or every general law, is textually and historically wrong. As a
textual matter, states had different limits. Nine limited the free exercise
of religion to “peaceable” actions or actions that would not disturb the
state’s “peace” or “safety.”278 Of these nine, four included licentious or
immoral acts;279 two others included acts that interfere with other
individuals’ religious practices;280 one added acts that injure or disturb
others;281 another inserted acts contrary to good order;282 and one more
included acts contrary to society’s happiness, peace, and safety. 283 It is
implausible to presume these terms and variations had the same meaning.
Recorded debates over the limiting terms also occurred in two states.284
In Virginia, James Madison and George Mason disagreed about the terms
and proposed competing limiting provisions.285 John Jay and Gouverneur
Morris did the same in New York.286 If, as the Smith majority must have
assumed, the terms referred to any general law, then these debates and
conflicting proposals were senseless.287 Thus, these terms clearly “were
not idle rhetorical variations.”288
iii. No limiting terms in the federal Free Exercise Clause suggests limits
apply only by necessity based on the free exercise principle’s scope.
Because the federal Free Exercise Clause includes no limitations,
courts should imply limits by necessity based on the free exercise
principle’s scope. The colonial and state free exercise limits show the free
exercise principle’s scope. At the founding, the principle guaranteed the
right to freely exercise religion unless a religious practice undermined
peace and safety or, in some cases, conflicted with another vital state
interest. Thus, these limitations mark the principle’s boundaries. The
278. The nine states are Delaware, Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and South Carolina. See supra note 273.
279. The four states are Maryland, New York, Rhode Island, and South Carolina. See infra text
accompanying notes 321, 325, 328, 329.
280. The two states are Massachusetts and New Hampshire. See infra text accompanying notes 322,
323.
281. The state is Rhode Island. See infra text accompanying notes 318, 328.
282. The state is Maryland. See infra text accompanying note 321.
283. The state is Delaware. See infra text accompanying note 319.
284. McConnell, supra note 186, at 837.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
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federal Bill of Rights simply adopted the familiar principle without noting
its established limits.
The Virginia Bill of Rights is instructive. George Mason proposed a
broad free exercise limitation that excluded religious exercise that
disturbs society’s peace, happiness, or safety.289 This proposed language
arguably included all generally applicable laws.290 Madison objected and
proposed a narrow limitation that only excepted religious exercise when
it “manifestly” endangered “the preservation of equal liberty and the
existence of the State.”291 The Virginia legislature compromised through
silence. It chose to protect the broad right and left others to imply
limitations by necessity based on the free exercise principle’s scope.292
Following this example, Madison did not include a limitation when he
first drafted the federal Free Exercise Clause. Congress followed that
approach and constitutionally recognized the free exercise principle,
omitting any limitations. This suggests that the Founders understood the
free exercise principle’s scope and expected that others would carefully
imply limits by necessity based on the principle’s scope.
4. Smith conflicts with the free exercise
principle’s original application.
The colonial and state exemption tradition suggests that the free
exercise principle entails religious exemptions from generally applicable
laws.293 During the founding era, conflict between law and religion
involved three issues: oath requirements, military conscription, and
religious assessments.294 Religious exemptions resolved each conflict.
Oath requirements were by far the most common conflict.295 Quakers
and other Protestant sects believed that it was wrong to take oaths or swear
allegiance to civil authority.296 Without accommodation, their beliefs
would have prevented them from testifying in court, leaving them unable
to protect themselves legally from adversaries. 297 A no-exemption policy
would have only allowed the government to eliminate the oath
requirement for everyone or insist on the requirement without exception.
Yet virtually every state rejected those choices. By 1789, nearly all states

289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

McConnell, supra note 141, at 1462.
Id. at 1463.
Id.
Id.; see infra text accompanying note 330.
McConnell, supra note 141, at 1466.
Id.
Id. at 1467.
Id.
Id.
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resolved the conflict by providing religious exemptions. 298
Conflicts also occurred over military conscription. Quakers and
Mennonites refused to bear arms for religious reasons.299 Significant
debate occurred because of this exemption’s cost. An exemption required
people with other religious beliefs to disproportionately bear the military
burden. Yet Rhode Island, North Carolina, and Maryland exempted
religious objectors from military service; New York, Massachusetts,
Virginia, and New Hampshire later did the same.300
During the Revolutionary War, the Continental Congress, which
struggled at times to field an army, granted exemptions for religious
objectors using these words:
As there are some people, who, from religious principles, cannot bear arms
in any case, this Congress intend no violence to their consciences, but
earnestly recommend it to them, to contribute liberally in this time of
universal calamity, to the relief of their distressed brethren in the several
colonies, and to do all other services to their oppressed Country, which
they can consistently with their religious principles.301

This policy is significant. It mirrors the worldview that Madison
described in his Memorial and Remonstrance. The policy treats religious
conscience as a duty that supersedes society’s claims, even during
“universal calamity.”302 The policy, moreover, allows the religious
objector to determine the appropriate accommodation—it does not
compel an alternative payment or cost.
Conflicts between faith and law also occurred in states and colonies
with established churches. 303 These governments required citizens to
financially support either the established church or another church the
citizen preferred. 304 Baptists, Quakers, and others, however, opposed
government compelled tithing for religious reasons.305 The Smith
principle would have resolved these conflicts by crushing religious
opposition. Many states instead offered religious accommodation.
Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Virginia, for example,
all responded by exempting religious objectors from these laws. 306
These exemptions show that the founding generation viewed

298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

Id. at 1468.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1469.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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accommodation as the solution when law and religion conflict.307
Although legislators granted these exemptions, the source is unimportant
since the Constitution—and constitutional judicial review—did not yet
exist.308 The legislature was the only government option for
accommodation. The critical question is whether individuals at the
founding considered exemption the appropriate government remedy when
law and conscience clash.309 The answer, based on practice, is “yes”—the
founding generation viewed exemption, not general regulation, as the
solution.
The Founders’ exemption pattern shows how they applied the free
exercise principle. The Founders consistently exempted religiously
motivated conduct from laws to protect religious liberty. 310 It did not
matter that the laws generally applied, requiring everyone to swear oaths,
serve in the military, and tithe. The Founders lifted these laws to preserve
religious liberty.311
When the Founders enshrined the free exercise principle in the
Constitution, they would have expected it to function the same way.312
They would not have expected a change because of constitutional rather
than legislative recognition. The Founders would have expected judges to
protect religious liberty under the Free Exercise Clause to the same degree
legislators had before the First Amendment.313 The Founders did not enact
the Free Exercise Clause to provide less protection for religious liberty
than the protection legislators already offered.
CONCLUSION
Smith was wrongly decided. Without briefing or argument over the
issue, Smith eliminated the constitutional right to freely exercise religion.
It did so under a hypothetical question irrelevant under state law. In its
holding, Smith ignored the parties, amici, and lower court who all agreed
that the Free Exercise Clause protects individuals from generally
applicable laws.
There is no reason to retain Smith. The Smith majority did not
determine what the constitutional text means—it simply asserted, without
evidence, that its interpretation is “a permissible reading.”314 Although it

307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

McConnell, supra note 186, at 839–40.
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 559 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
McConnell, supra, note 141, at 1470.
Id. at 1466–72.
Id.
Flores, 521 U.S. at 559–60 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Id.
Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990) (emphasis added).
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claimed that precedent confirmed its interpretation, the majority could
only marshal two discredited opinions as its chief precedents. At the same
time, it either ignored or failed to distinguish many precedents that
contradict Smith. In the end, the decision rests on five Justices’ mistaken
belief that religious liberty must perish to prevent anarchy and avoid
judicial balancing. In short, Smith offers no sound reason for its holding.
Above all, Smith contradicts the Free Exercise Clause’s text, purpose,
and original meaning. The text is plain: it promises religious liberty to all.
It contains no exception. The reason is simple: as Madison put it, religious
duties come from God, and so they come before civil duties. On that basis,
the colonies and states adopted provisions protecting the free exercise of
religion, and they granted religious exemptions when law and religion
conflicted. Through these provisions and practices, a legal principle
emerged: the government may not prohibit religious exercise unless it
endangers peace and safety. The Founders enshrined this principle in the
Free Exercise Clause. Smith erases it.
Smith discards a sacred, unalienable right that our Founders
guaranteed. All Americans will be poorer until the Court revisits Smith
and restores the Free Exercise Clause.
APPENDIX A: COLONIAL FREE EXERCISE CLAUSES
1. Carolina Charter (1665)315
[N]o person or persons unto whom such liberty shall be given, shall be
any way molested, punished, disquieted, or called in question, for any
differences in opinion, or practice in matters of religious concernments,
who do not actually disturb the civil peace of the province, county or
colony, that they shall make their abode in: But all and every such person
and persons may, from time to time, and at all times, freely and quietly
have and enjoy his and their judgments and consciences, in matters of
religion, throughout all the said province or colony, they behaving
themselves peaceably, and not using this liberty to licentiousness, nor to
the civil injury, or outward disturbance of others.
2. Maryland Act Concerning Religion (1649)316
[N]oe person or psons whatsoever within this Province, or the Islands,
Ports, Harbors, Creekes, or havens thereunto belonging professing to
315. Charter of Carolina (1665), reprinted in 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note
242, at 2771, https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/thorpe-the-federal-and-state-constitutions-vol-v-new-jerseyphilippine-islands, also available at https://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/nc04.asp.
316. An Act Concerning Religion (1649), reprinted in 1 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND, supra note 241,
at 244–77, https://msa.maryland.gov/megafile/msa/speccol/sc2900/sc2908/000001/000001/html/am1-244.html, also available at https://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendI_religions5.html.
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beleive in Jesus Christ, shall from henceforth bee any waies troubled,
Molested or discountenanced for or in respect of his or her religion nor in
the free exercise thereof within this Province or the Islands thereunto
belonging nor any way compelled to the beleife or exercise of any other
Religion against his or her consent, soe as they be not unfaithfull to the
Lord Proprietary, or molest or conspire against the civill Governemt.
established or to bee established in this Province under him or his heires.
3. New Jersey Agreement (1664)317
That no person qualified as aforesaid within the said Province, at any
time shall be any ways molested, punished, disquieted or called in
question for any difference in opinion or practice in matter of religious
concernments, who do not actually disturb the civil peace of the said
Province; but that all and every such person and persons may from time
to time, and at all times, freely and fully have and enjoy his and their
judgments and consciences in' masters of religion throughout the said
Province they behaving themselves peaceably and quietly, and not using
this liberty to licentiousness, nor to the civil injury or outward disturbance
of others; any law, statute or clause contained, or to be contained, usuage
or custom of this realm of England, to the contrary thereof in any wise
notwithstanding.
4. Rhode Island Charter (1663)318
[N]oe person within the sayd colonye, at any tyme hereafter, shall bee
any wise molested, punished, disquieted, or called in question, for any
differences in opinione in matters of religion, and doe not actually disturb
the civill peace of our sayd colony; but that all and everye person and
persons may, from tyme to tyme, and at all tymes hereafter, freelye and
fullye have and enjoye his and theire owne judgments and consciences,
in matters of religious concernments, throughout the tract of land
hereafter mentioned; they behaving themselves peaceablie and quietlie,
and not useing this libertie to lycentiousnesse and profanenesse, nor to the
civill injurye or outward disturbeance of others; any lawe, statute, or
clause, therein contayned, or to bee contayned, usage or custome of this
realme, to the contrary hereof, in any wise, notwithstanding.

317. The Concession and Agreement of the Lords Proprietors of the Province of New Caesarea, or
New Jersey (1664), reprinted in 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 242, at 2537,
https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/thorpe-the-federal-and-state-constitutions-vol-v-new-jersey-philippineislands, also available at https://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/nj02.asp.
318. Charter of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations (1663), reprinted in 6 FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 242, at 3213, https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/thorpe-the-federal-andstate-constitutions-vol-vi-porto-rico-vermont, also available at https://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century
/ri04.asp.
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APPENDIX B: STATE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSES
1. Delaware Declaration of Rights (1776)319
Sect. 2. That all men have a natural and unalienable right to worship
Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences and
understandings; and that no man ought or of right can be compelled to
attend any religious worship or maintain any ministry contrary to or
against his own free will and consent, and that no authority can or ought
to be vested in, or assumed by any power whatever that shall in any case
interfere with, or in any manner controul the right of conscience in the
free exercise of religious worship.
Sect. 3. That all persons professing the Christian religion ought forever
to enjoy equal rights and privileges in this state, unless, under colour of
religion, any man disturb the peace, the happiness or safety of society.
2. Georgia Constitution (1777)320
ART. LVI. All persons whatever shall have the free exercise of their
religion; provided it be not repugnant to the peace and safety of the State;
and shall not, unless by consent, support any teacher or teachers except
those of their own profession.
3. Maryland Constitution (1776)321
XXXIII. That, as it is the duty of every man to worship God in such
manner as he thinks most acceptable to him; all persons, professing the
Christian religion, are equally entitled to protection in their religious
liberty; wherefore no person ought by any law to be molested in his person
or estate on account of his religious persuasion or profession, or for his
religious practice; unless, under colour of religion, any man shall disturb
the good order, peace or safety of the State, or shall infringe the laws of
morality, or injure others, in their natural, civil, or religious rights . . . .
4. Massachusetts Constitution (1780)322
Article II. It is the right as well as the duty of all men in society,
319. Delaware Declaration of Rights (1776), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 5
(Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987), https://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/bill_
of_rightss4.html.
320. GA. CONST. of 1777, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 242, at
784, https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/thorpe-the-federal-and-state-constitutions-vol-ii-florida-kansas, also
available at https://avalon. law.yale.edu/18th_century/ga02.asp.
321. MD. CONST. of 1776, reprinted in 3 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 242, at
1689, https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/thorpe-the-federal-and-state-constitutions-vol-iii-kentucky-massach
usetts, also available at https://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/ma02.asp.
322. MASS. CONST. of 1780, reprinted in 3 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 242,
at 1889, https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/thorpe-the-federal-and-state-constitutions-vol-iii-kentucky-massa
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publicly, and at stated seasons, to worship the SUPREME BEING, the
great Creator and Preserver of the universe. And no subject shall be hurt,
molested, or restrained, in his person, liberty, or estate, for
worshipping GOD in the manner and season most agreeable to the
dictates of his own conscience; or for his religious profession or
sentiments; provided he doth not disturb the public peace, or obstruct
others in their religious worship.
5. New Hampshire Constitution (1784)323
IV. Among the natural rights, some are in their very nature unalienable,
because no equivalent can be given or received for them. Of this kind are
the RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE.
V. Every individual has a natural and unalienable right to
worship GOD according to the dictates of his own conscience, and
reason; and no subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained in his person,
liberty or estate for worshipping GOD, in the manner and season most
agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience, or for his religious
profession, sentiments or persuasion; provided he doth not disturb the
public peace, or disturb others, in their religious worship.
6. New Jersey Constitution (1776)324
XVIII. That no person shall ever, within this Colony, be deprived of
the inestimable privilege of worshipping Almighty God in a manner
agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience . . . .
XIX. That there shall be no establishment of any one religious sect in
this Province, in preference to another; and that no Protestant inhabitant
of this Colony shall be denied the enjoyment of any civil right, merely on
account of his religious principles; but that all persons, professing a belief
in the faith of any Protestant sect. who shall demean themselves peaceably
under the government, as hereby established, shall be capable of being
elected into any office of profit or trust, or being a member of either
branch of the Legislature, and shall fully and freely enjoy every privilege
and immunity, enjoyed by others their fellow subjects.

chusetts, also available at https://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch1s6.html.
323. N.H. CONST. of 1784, reprinted in 4 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 242,
at 2454, https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/thorpe-the-federal-and-state-constitutions-vol-iv-michigan-newhampshire, also available at https://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendI_religions42.
html.
324. N.J. CONST. of 1776, reprinted in 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 242, at
2597–98,
https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/thorpe-the-federal-and-state-constitutions-vol-v-new-jerseyphilippine-islands, also available at https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/nj15.asp.
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7. New York Constitution (1777)325
XXXVIII. And whereas we are required, by the benevolent principles
of rational liberty, not only to expel civil tyranny, but also to guard against
that spiritual oppression and intolerance wherewith the bigotry and
ambition of weak and wicked priests and princes have scourged mankind,
this convention doth further, in the name and by the authority of the good
people of this State, ordain, determine, and declare, that the free exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever hereafter be allowed, within
this State, to all mankind: Provided, That the liberty of conscience, hereby
granted, shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or
justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of this State.
8. North Carolina Constitution (1776)326
XIX. That all men have a natural and unalienable right to worship
Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences.
9. Pennsylvania Constitution (1776)327
II. That all men have a natural and unalienable right to worship
Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences and
understanding: And that no man ought or of right can be compelled to
attend any religious worship, or erect or support any place of worship, or
maintain any ministry, contrary to, or against, his own free will and
consent: Nor can any man, who acknowledges the being of a God, be
justly deprived or abridged of any civil right as a citizen, on account of
his religious sentiments or peculiar mode of religious worship: And that
no authority can or ought to be vested in, or assumed by any power
whatever, that shall in any case interfere with, or in any manner controul,
the right of conscience in the free exercise of religious worship.
10. Rhode Island Charter (1663)328
[N]oe person within the sayd colonye, at any tyme hereafter, shall bee
any wise molested, punished, disquieted, or called in question, for any
325. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, reprinted in 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 242,
at 2636–37, https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/thorpe-the-federal-and-state-constitutions-vol-v-new-jerseyphilippine-islands, also available at https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/ny01.asp.
326. N.C. CONST. of 1776, reprinted in 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 242, at
2788, https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/thorpe-the-federal-and-state-constitutions-vol-v-new-jersey-philip
pine-islands, also available at https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/nc07.asp#b5.
327. PA. CONST. of 1776, reprinted in 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 242, at
3082, https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/thorpe-the-federal-and-state-constitutions-vol-v-new-jersey-philipp
ine-islands, also available at https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/pa08.asp.
328. See supra note 318. This is identical to the colonial provision recorded above. It is listed again
here as a state provision because Rhode Island’s charter governed until it adopted a constitution in 1842.
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differences in opinione in matters of religion, and doe not actually disturb
the civill peace of our sayd colony; but that all and everye person and
persons may, from tyme to tyme, and at all tymes hereafter, freelye and
fullye have and enjoye his and theire owne judgments and consciences,
in matters of religious concernments, throughout the tract of lande
hereafter mentioned; they behaving themselves peaceablie and quietlie,
and not useing this libertie to lycentiousnesse and profanenesse, nor to the
civill injurye or outward disturbeance of others; any lawe, statute, or
clause, therein contayned, or to bee contayned, usage or custome of this
realme, to the contrary hereof, in any wise, notwithstanding.
11. South Carolina Constitution (1790)329
ARTICLE VIII SECTION 1. The free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference,
shall forever hereafter be allowed within this State to all mankind:
Provided, That the liberty of conscience thereby declared shall not be so
construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify practices
inconsistent with the peace or safety of this State.
12. Virginia Bill of Rights (1776)330
Sec. 16. That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator and the
manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction,
not by force or violence; and therefore all men are equally entitled to the
free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience; and that
it is the mutual duty of all to practice Christian forbearance, love, and
charity towards each other.

329. S.C. CONST. of 1790, reprinted in 6 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 242, at
3264,
https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/thorpe-the-federal-and-state-constitutions-vol-vi-porto-ricovermont, also available at https://www.carolana.com/SC/Documents/sc_constitution_1790.html.
330. Virginia Bill of Rights (1776), reprinted in 7 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 242, at 3814, https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/thorpe-the-federal-and-state-constitutions-vol-viivirginia-wyoming-index, also available at https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/virginia.asp.
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